O’Neill addresses the Kantian moral concepts of not treating others as means (i.e., using them) and treating them positively as persons, how these are related, and finally how “an adequate understanding of what it is to treat others as persons must view them not abstractly as possibly consenting adults, but as particular men and women with limited and determinate capacities to understand or consent to proposals of action.” The Kantian moral ideal so far as it has practical application must take account of human limitations.
| S | M | T | W | T | F | S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| « Aug | Oct » | |||||
| 1 | ||||||
| 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 |
| 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 |
| 30 | ||||||
- Information
- Sortals
- aesthetics
- Agacinski
- animals
- anti-Semitism
- aristotle
- Criminality
- cynicism
- de Beauvoir
- epistemology
- Freud
- General
- Heterocosmos
- Hobbes
- Hume
- interviews
- Kant
- Lispector
- Locke
- logic
- Marx
- Mill, H. T.
- Mill, J. S.
- Moral Consciousness
- moral education
- Moral Theory
- News
- Nietzsche
- philosophical hatred
- philosophical method
- philosophy and sex
- political philosophy
- religion
- suicide
- Weininger
- Wittgenstein
-
Search
- Meta
