phlogma

Summary of a lecture, “Hiroshima: New Facts & Old Myths,” (delivered in Ames, IA, 7 Nov 1994) by Gar Alperovitz, professor of political economy at the University of Maryland, author of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

The possible ways the United States could have ended the war in the spring and summer of 1945:

1. Let the Russians come in. (The war in Europe had ended in May, the Russians were willing, and they would soon be ready and there was little doubt the mere threat of the Russians would nudge an already desperate Japan over the edge.)

2. Let the Japanese keep their emperor as figurehead. (They were near the end of their rope that summer and had more than hinted that any assurances to this effect would precipitate their surrender. Because the emperor was viewed as a deity, not to do so, would assure a fight to the death.)

3. Invade. (Plans were in the works for this to happen by November if nothing intervened; forces were preparing to move from Europe to the Pacific.)

4. The bomb. (Aug 6th and 9th.)

The first three options were eliminated. We didn’t want the Russians dominant in Asia as they had already shown themselves a force to contend with in Europe and we wanted them “manageable” which the successful use of the atomic bomb would make easier. We deliberately ignored the second option to force the choice between options three and four.

The American casualties of an invasion in November were estimated at 500,00 to a million at the time, and these numbers remain in the public imagination. By most sober accounts the numbers were wildly exaggerated, truer numbers would have been closer to a tenth of these. And the casualty rate would have been near zero if option two had been taken. But the inflated numbers were touted to force the issue and, therefore, option 4.

The atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki not to defeat the Japanese. They were very nearly already defeated. It was not to save hundreds of thousands of American lives. There was a simpler way to do that. The reason we dropped the bomb on Japan was to impress the Russians. It was to make ourselves feared in the postwar environment. It succeeded in spurring on the Russians to match our nuclear capability.

Then, and now everyone else…

Cf. Luno, Philosophical Notebook XII, section 53.